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Abstract  
  
 In this paper we examine international practices in the ways in 
which the individual income tax is applied to families, focusing upon 
country practices in OECD countries.  We find that countries differ 
significantly in their taxation of the family, but that the dominant practice 
is the choice of the individual rather than the family as the unit of 
taxation.  We also calculate the income tax consequences for 
“representative” taxpayers across these countries, and find that the 
differences in taxes between singles and married couples can often be 
quite large.  We conclude that choosing the individual as the tax unit is 
likely to represent the most equitable approach to income taxation, 
especially given the increasing complexity of family units in modern 
societies. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 Nearly all countries around the world attempt to impose an 
individual income tax.  However, in administering such a tax, each 
country must decide exactly what constitutes an “individual”; that is, each 
country must choose the “unit of taxation” in the individual income tax.  
Traditionally, this choice has been seen as one between the family and the 
individual.  In the former case, the incomes of all members of a family are 
aggregated, and the income tax (with all of its relevant provisions) is then 
imposed on total family income.  In the latter case, each individual is 
taxed only on his or her own individual income, even if he or she is a 
member of a family unit in which other members have taxable income. 
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 The choice between the family and individual as the unit of 
taxation is not clear-cut, and involves difficult tradeoffs between 
competing and worthwhile goals.  These goals include the desire to treat 
families with equal incomes equally, to treat families and individuals 
equally, to ensure that taxes do not change with marriage (or divorce), and 
to impose taxes at progressive rates.  With the dramatic increase in recent 
years of different family “types” – cohabiting but not legally married 
couples, extended families, same-sex couples, unrelated individuals living 
together – these issues have become even more complicated. 
 
 This paper examines the choices that different countries have 
made in choosing the unit of taxation, or what is often referred to as 
“taxing the family”.  We focus in particular on practices in Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries.  We 
present detailed information on the income tax systems in these countries, 
and we use this information to calculate the impact of taxes on different 
“representative” types of family units across OECD countries under 
income tax laws in 2002, in order to see whether we can learn from the 
comparative practice of taxing the family in the individual income tax.  We 
find that countries differ significantly in their taxation of the family, but 
that the dominant practice is the choice of the individual rather than the 
family as the unit of taxation.  We also find that the differences in taxes 
between singles and married couples can often be quite large.  We 
conclude that choosing the individual as the tax unit is likely to represent 
the most equitable approach to income taxation, especially given the 
increasing complexity of family units in modern societies. 
 
 In the next section we discuss some general issues in choosing the 
unit of taxation.  We then focus on United States practices as a case study 
and the ways in which the U.S. has made different decisions over time in 
its taxation of the family.  In the following section we examine the 
different treatments in OECD countries.  The final section contains some 
concluding remarks. 
 
 
Some Principles and Goals in Taxing the Family 
 
 Countries have a variety of goals in choosing the structure of the 
individual income tax. 
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 A basic goal of most all taxes is to achieve “equity” in taxation.  Of 
course, defining equity is quite difficult.1  One popular notion of equity is 
based upon the “ability-to-pay” principle of taxation, which states that 
taxpayers should pay taxes according to their ability to pay.  This principle 
is often operationalized by introducing two additional criteria: “horizontal 
equity”, which relates to the income tax treatment of taxpayers with equal 
incomes, and “vertical equity”, which refers to the treatment of taxpayers 
with different levels of income.  Consider the implications of both 
horizontal and vertical equity for the taxation of the family. 
 
 Horizontal equity requires that taxpayers who are equal in all 
relevant respects pay equal amounts of taxes.  This notion may appear 
simple, but it is in fact deceptively simple.  The difficulty lies in defining 
“equals”.  Equals can be thought of as married couples with equal family 
income (and identical characteristics), in which case horizontal equity 
requires that such families pay equal amounts of income taxes.  However, 
suppose we define equals as any kind of household with equal income.  
Now things become much more complicated.  A “household” can consist of 
a married couple, but it can also consist of a single individual, an 
unmarried cohabiting couple, a same-sex couple, an extended family, or 
even a group of unrelated individuals living together.  Achieving 
horizontal equity requires that all of these households pay equal taxes if 
their incomes are equal. 
 
 If a married couple is seen as the relevant household type for 
defining equals, then achieving the goal of Horizontal Equity Across 
Households requires that married couples with equal incomes pay equal 
taxes.  However, if a household is defined more broadly, then achieving 
this goal requires that any households with equal income pay the same 
amount of taxes.  In particular, it requires what Berliant and Rothstein 
(2003) refer to as the additional and separate goal of Equal Payments by 
Singles and Couples.  Of course, this goal can be broadened to apply to all 
household types. 
 
 As for the criteria of vertical equity, this requires that taxpayers 
with greater ability pay greater amounts of taxes, and so relates to the 
rate structure of the income tax.  Even so, we cannot unambiguously 
determine whether vertical equity implies that there should be a 
progressive, a proportional, or a regressive rate structure; that is, we 
cannot say whether marginal (or average) tax rates should rise more 
than proportionately, proportionately, or less than proportionately to 
income (Musgrave, 1959).  However, it is generally felt that a 
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progressive rate structure is best able to achieve vertical equity.2  We 
refer to this as the Progressivity goal of taxation. 
 
 Still another goal in the individual income tax is Marriage 
Neutrality.  This goal requires that a couple’s combined tax liability 
remain unchanged with marriage, neither rising with marriage (a 
“marriage tax” or a “marriage penalty”) nor falling with marriage (a 
“marriage subsidy” or a “marriage bonus”).  For example, it is well 
documented that the U.S. individual income tax is not marriage neutral 
(Rosen, 1987; Feenberg and Rosen, 1995; U.S. General Accounting 
Office, 1996; Alm and Whittington, 1996; Congressional Budget Office, 
1997; Bull, Holtzblatt, Nunns, and Rebilein, 1998; Dickert-Conlin and 
Houser, 1998; Whittington and Alm, 2001; Alm, Whittingon, and 
Fletcher, 2002).  As discussed in more detail later, these studies 
indicate the presence of a large and variable marriage penalty – and 
marriage bonus – whose magnitude has changed over time.  Other 
countries often have different experiences. 
 
 It is now well-known that no individual income tax can achieve 
the simultaneous goals of Horizontal Equity Across Families, Equal 
Payments By Singles and Couples, Progressivity, and Marriage 
Neutrality (Rosen, 1977; Berliant and Rothstein, 2003).  To illustrate 
this more precisely, consider the following stylized example. 
 
 Suppose that the individual income tax consists of a constant 
marginal tax rate (bi) and a lump-sum guarantee (ai), where i=(S,M) for 
Single and Married individuals.  Suppose also that the tax TS imposed 
on single individuals equals 
 
TS  = -aS + bS YS 
 
where YS is the income of the single individual, while the tax TM on 
married couples equals 
 
TM  = -aM + bM (YM1 + YM2), 
 
where YM1 is the income of one partner and YM2 is the income of the 
other partner. 
 
Marriage Neutrality requires that taxes do not change with 
marriage, which requires in turn that aM = 2aS and that bM = bS.  Equal 
Payments By Singles and Couples requires that TS = TM when YS = YM1 
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+ YM2; this imposes the conditions that aM = aS and that bM = bS.   
Horizontal Equity Across Families is met as long as married couples 
face the same lump-sum guarantee and marginal tax rate.  Meeting all 
of these conditions is possible only if aS = 0 = aM and if bS = bM.  
However, Progressivity, at least defined in terms of average tax rates 
that increase with income, requires that aS (and aM) be less than zero 
and that bS (and bM) be greater than zero; that is, it is only possible to 
achieve the goals of Marriage Neutrality, Equal Payments By Singles 
and Couples, and Horizontal Equity Across Families if we are willing to 
sacrifice the goal of Progressivity.  Put differently, no progressive tax 
system can simultaneously achieve all the other goals of the individual 
income tax. 
 
Choosing the features of the individual income tax therefore 
requires that countries must face tradeoffs in their pursuit of 
worthwhile goals.  The next two sections discuss the different choices 
that countries have made. 
 
 
The United States Practice of Taxing the Family 
 
The individual income tax in the U.S. was established in 1913, 
and its treatment of the family has varied over time.  In its early years, 
the basic unit of taxation was the individual, in which each individual 
was taxed on the basis of his or her income independently of marital 
status.  Because the tax liability did not change much with marriage, 
the income tax largely achieved Marriage Neutrality, at the same time 
as marginal tax rates that increased with income generated 
Progressivity.  However, the Revenue Act of 1948 changed the unit of 
taxation from the individual to the family.  With the adoption of income 
splitting for married couples, couples were now allowed to aggregate 
and to divide in half their income for federal tax purposes.  This change 
meant that couples with equal incomes paid equal taxes; that is, the 
income tax became consistent with the goal of Horizontal Equity Across 
Families.  However, because of the progressive tax rates in the income 
tax, the change also meant that a couple's joint tax liability could fall 
when they married, so that the income tax was no longer characterized 
by Marriage Neutrality. 
 
It was not until the Tax Reform Act of 1969 that a widespread 
and significant marriage penalty was created for many married couples, 
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even though a potential marriage subsidy still existed for some couples. 
 Since then, various tax and demographic changes have markedly 
affected the potential for a marriage penalty or subsidy, as well as the 
magnitude of each (Alm and Whittington, 1996; Congressional Budget 
Office, 1997). 
 
The reason for the lack of marriage neutrality under current law 
is simple to explain.  Married couples effectively split their income on 
tax returns.  If two people marry and one of them has zero income, 
income splitting means that the individual with some income moves 
into a lower marginal tax bracket as a result of the marriage, so that 
the marriage reduces the combined tax burdens of the two partners.  
Conversely, when people with similar earnings marry, their combined 
income pushes the couple into higher tax brackets than they face as 
singles, and they pay correspondingly higher taxes with marriage.3  Of 
course, the magnitude of the tax/subsidy depends upon an array of tax 
features, such as exemptions, deductions, and rate schedules, as well as 
the incomes and other characteristics of the partners.4    Note, however, 
that the marriage tax/subsidy is not a statutory item in the tax code.  
Rather, it is a side effect of the current structure of the individual 
income tax, one that emerges because of the combination of progressive 
marginal tax rates and the family as the unit of taxation. 
 
To illustrate marriage penalties and bonuses more precisely, 
consider the following hypothetical couples.  Assume that in 2001 two 
people each have an annual income of $30,000.  Assume also that each 
uses one personal exemption of $2,900 and that each takes the standard 
deduction of $4,550.  Each has an income tax liability of $3,383, and 
their combined tax liabilities as singles total $6,766.  If they were to 
marry and use the standard deduction for married couples filing jointly 
($7,600) and two personal exemptions, then their married tax liability 
would be $7,172. This hypothetical couple would pay $406 more in 
federal income taxes as a married couple than they would as two single 
individuals.  This difference in tax liability ($406) is the so-called 
marriage penalty (or marriage tax), and demonstrates that the income 
tax is not marriage neutral. 
 
It is also easy to construct examples in which combined taxes fall 
with marriage.  If one person in this couple had most or, especially, all 
of the family income, then the couple would experience a reduced 
income tax liability – a marriage bonus or subsidy – as a result of 
marriage.  For example, a single individual with income of $60,000 
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would have a tax liability of $11,198.  If this individual were to marry 
someone with no income (and no income tax liability), then their taxes 
as a married couple would decline from $11,198 to $7,172, giving them 
a marriage subsidy of $4,026. 
 
Note that this example also illustrates the unequal treatment of 
individuals and couples.  An individual with income of $60,000 pays 
taxes of $11,198; a married couple with the same income pays taxes of 
only $7,172.  A single individual therefore pays $4,026 more in taxes 
than a married couple with equal income, a difference (the so-called 
“singles tax”) that is necessarily equal in magnitude but of opposite sign 
to the marriage subsidy (Alm, Whittington, and Fletcher, 2002). 
 
In general, the existence and magnitude of the marriage penalty 
depends on the distribution of income across the two partners because 
its calculation requires comparing taxes as single versus taxes as 
married.  Dual income couples are most likely to incur a marriage 
penalty, especially if their incomes are similar and large.  Single-earner 
couples are likely to gain a tax subsidy through marriage due to income 
splitting. 
 
The magnitude of the marriage tax/subsidy in the U.S. can be 
quite large.  For example, Alm and Whittington (1996) estimate that 
there is on average a marriage tax whose magnitude since 1969 has 
risen, fallen, and more recently risen, and in the last several years has 
averaged roughly $400 (in real 1997 dollars).  However, this overall 
average conceals a great deal of variation.  The percentage of families 
that pay a penalty has risen since 1969, to nearly 60 percent in recent 
years; for these families the real average penalty has generally 
exceeded $1000 for most of the last twenty years.  On the other hand, 
for those families that receive a subsidy the average subsidy over this 
period has also typically exceeded $1000, and the percentage of families 
receiving a subsidy has fallen over time to less than 30 percent.  
Feenberg and Rosen (1995) generate similar estimates, while 
calculations by the Congressional Budget Office (1997) suggest that a 
higher percentage of families receives a subsidy (51 percent) and a 
lower percentage pays a penalty (42 percent).  Dickert-Conlin and 
Houser (1998) demonstrate that lower-income individuals are especially 
likely to face a marriage penalty, due to the interaction of transfers 
with the individual income tax.  Recent changes in the income tax laws, 
especially the Economic and Growth Recovery Act of 2001 and the Jobs 
Growth and Tax Reconciliation Act of 2003 have reduced but not 
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eliminated the marriage penalty/bonus.  In the longer run, the 
emergence of the Alternative Minimum Tax seems likely to contribute 
significantly to the marriage penalty/bonus. 
 
As emphasized earlier, no progressive tax system can 
simultaneously ensure that couples with equal income pay equal taxes, 
that families and individuals with equal incomes pay equal taxes, and 
that a couple’s joint tax liability does not change with marriage (Rosen, 
1977).  Whether by implicit or explicit choice, the U.S. has elected to 
focus more on the goal of equal treatment of married couples, with its 
designation of the family as the unit of taxation.  By necessity, then, the 
U.S. has elected to allow individuals and families to be treated 
differently, and also to allow taxes to change with marriage.  Other 
countries have made different choices, as we discuss next. 
 
 
International Practices in Taxing the Family 
 
The Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) is comprised of 32 member countries. These countries have 
many common characteristics, but their income tax structure is not one 
of these.  We have collected detailed information on the individual 
income tax systems for nearly all of these countries from a variety of 
sources, and Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4 summarize some of the main features 
of the individual income tax in these countries.5  Although income 
taxation at the central government level is present in all of these 
countries, the structure of the income tax exhibits significant 
heterogeneity.  
 
It should be noted that our discussion and our calculations are 
based on the income tax treatment of earned, or wage, income only; that 
is, we assume that income of the taxpayers consists only of wage 
income.  The treatment of investment income introduces significant 
complications.  For example, in most countries some shifting of capital 
gains or business income is permitted, although often such shifting 
appears to be to the disadvantage of the couple because the transfer of 
such income is permitted only when it is transferred to the spouse with 
the higher taxable income. 
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The Basic Structure of the Individual Income Tax 
 
 All OECD countries impose a progressive income tax.  However, 
these income systems differ in several dimensions. 
 
 One source of heterogeneity is the degree of progressivity across 
countries, as shown by different levels of marginal tax rates (MTRs) in 
the tax code.  Another source of heterogeneity is fiscal federalism in the 
assignment of income taxes. Countries that allow sub-national levels of 
government to impose a significant tax on incomes tend to have lower 
national income tax rates, in large part because of the sharing of the 
tax base across levels of government.  For example, in Norway the 
highest marginal tax rate on income at the central government level is 
only 13.5 percent, while provincial governments impose even higher 
individual income taxes, often around 14.5 percent.  In Finland, 
municipal income tax rates vary between 15.5 and 20 percent, and the 
highest national marginal tax rate on income is 35.5 percent. In 
contrast, neither Germany nor France employs income taxes at sub-
national levels, and the highest marginal tax rates on income at the 
national level in these countries are 48.50 and 49.58 percent, 
respectively.6  Austria and Belgium, the nations with the highest upper 
income marginal tax rates (50 percent in each case), also exhibit this 
tendency.  Austria has no provisions for any income taxes at the sub-
national level, and Belgium permits its municipalities to levy a small 
surcharge on the national income tax, between 0 and 8.5 percent. 
 
 Even aside from the level of marginal tax rates, the marginal tax 
rate structure itself exhibits significant variation (Tables 1 and 2).  In 
several countries the tax code is relatively complex with a large number 
of marginal tax rate brackets, while other countries implement a much 
simpler system.  Perhaps the most complex marginal tax rate structure 
is employed in Germany.  Although the German rate structure has 
three formally defined non-zero marginal tax rate brackets, only the 
highest marginal tax rate bracket has a fixed single rate.  The first two 
brackets implement non-fixed increasing rates with considerable 
variation.7  The largest number of marginal tax brackets is present in 
Luxemburg, where all non-zero rate brackets except for the highest 
bracket are increased by increments of only EUR 1,650.  Iceland, 
Ireland, Norway, and Sweden employ the simplest structure of 
marginal tax rates, with only two non-zero marginal tax rate brackets.  
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Table 1. Basic Personal Exemptions and Overview of the Marginal Tax Rate Structure – Single Taxpayers1  
Personal Tax 
Exemptions MTR Structure 
First non-zero MTR Bracket Highest Income Bracket  
COUNTRY 
Value of US$ 
in 
Local Currency 
31 December 
2002 Deductions Credits 
Upper Income 
Level 
for 
zero-MTR Bracket 
Income 
Range  MTR 
Starting 
Income Level  MTR 
Number of Non-zero 
MTR Brackets 
I       II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X
AUSTRALIA A$ 1.707   6,000 6,000 - 20,000 17 60,000 47 4 
AUSTRIA     EUR 1.0446 132 2 1232 3 3,640 3,640 - 7,270 21 50,870 50 4 
BELGIUM  EUR 1.0446 5,570 4    0 - 6,480 25 29,740 50 5 
CANADA CAN$ 1.5796  1241   0 - 32,182 16 104,647 29 4 
CZECH REPUBLIC CZK 30.141 38,040    0 - 109,200 15 331,200 32 4 
DENMARK DKK 7.0822  35,600 5     0 - 198,000 5.5 295,300 26.5 3 
FINLAND EUR 1.0446   11,600 11,600 - 14,400 12.5 55,200 35.5 5 
FRANCE  EUR 1.0446 6 7 4,191 4,191 - 8,242 7.05 47,131 49.58 6 
GERMANY   EUR 1.0446 1,044 8  7,235 7,236 - 9,251 19.96-23.02 55,007 48.5 3 
GREECE EUR 1.0446   10,000 10,000 - 13,400 15 23,400 40 3 
HUNGARY   HUF 225.03 9   0 - 650,000 20 1,350,000 40 3 
ICELAND  ISK  312,024   0 - 3,980,000 25.75 3,980,000 32.75 2 
IRELAND 10 EUR 1.0446  1,520   0 - 28,000 20 28,000 42 2 
ITALY 11   EUR 1.0446 3,000 235 12 13   0 - 15,000 23 70,000 45 5 
JAPAN  YUN 121.23 380,000 14 15   0 - 3,300,000 10 18,000,000 37 4 
KOREA, REPUBLIC W 1,200.4 1,000,000    0 - 10,000,000 9 80,000,000 36 4 
LUXEMBURG EUR 1.0446          600 16 9,750 9,750-11,400 8 34,500 38 16
MEXICO  PS 10.3125 17 18   0 - 5,211.78 3 636,170 35 8 
NETHERLANDS    EUR 1.0446 1,766 19   0 – 15,883 1.7 20    49,464 52 4
NEW ZEALAND NZ$ 1.90114     0 – 38,000 19.5 60,001 39 3 
NORWAY 21          NOK 6.9657 22 340,700
340,700 – 
872,000 13.5 872,000 19.5 2
POLAND  PLZ 4.0512 530.08 23    0 – 37,024 19 74,048 40 3 
PORTUGAL EUR 1.0446  213.96   0 - 4,182.12 12 52,277 40 6 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC SKK 40.036 38,760    0 – 90,000 10 564,000 38 5 
SPAIN EUR 1.0446   3,400 24    0 – 4,000 15 45,000 45 5 
SWEDEN SEK 8.4700 
11,400 – 
25,900  284,300 284,300 - 430,000 20    430,000 25 2
SWITZERLAND  CHF 1.38210 25  12,800 12,800 - 27,800 0.77 664,300 11.5 10 
TURKEY TL 1,634,501 540,000,000    0 – 5,000,000,000 15    120,000,000,000 40 6
UNITED KINGDOM ₤ 0.63 4,615    0 – 1,920 10 29,900 40 3 
UNITED STATES  --- 7,800 26     0 – 6000 10 311,950 38.6 6 
1  All monetary values are entered in local currencies. 
2  This is the standard deduction for expenses associated with income. 
3  This includes the basic credit at its maximum value of EUR 887 available to all taxpayers with incomes less than EUR 35,421, the 
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employment tax credit of EUR 54 available to all taxpayers with earned income, and EUR 291, the traffic tax credit, also available to 
taxpayers with earned incomes.  The basic credit is based on a number of different factors including the income and personal circumstances 
of the taxpayer, and is reduced to zero if the total taxable income exceeds EUR 35,421. 
4  In addition to this personal exemption, the taxpayer is entitled to a lump-sum deduction for expenses incurred in earning income; the 
deduction is based on the income level of the taxpayer, and is capped at EUR 3,000.  It is important to note that the personal exemption is 
computed based on the lowest marginal tax rate brackets, and the result is deducted from the tax liability, while the deduction is applied to 
the gross income before the computation of the tax. 
5  Usually the allowance is converted to a tax credit at the lowest marginal tax rate of 5.5 percent. 
6  Two personal deductions are available to French taxpayers, the basic deduction and the supplementary deduction. The basic deduction is 
the higher of the two amounts: actual substantiated expenses associated with employment or lump sum of 10 percent of the income net of 
social security contributions. The minimum balance for the basic deduction is EUR 370. In addition, the taxpayer can claim a 
supplementary deduction of 20 percent on the first EUR 113,900 of the income net of social security contributions and the basic deduction. 
7  In addition to this deduction, French households are eligible to an employment bonus tax credit, which is available to low income 
households. The credit is computed as 4.4 percent of annual employment (or self-employment) income. 
8  Employees are entitled to deduct any expenses incurred in earning income; if those expenses do not exceed EUR 1,044, a lump sum 
deduction of EUR 1,044 may be claimed. 
9  An employment credit is available to all taxpayers with employment income, and is based on the salary of the taxpayer. Taxpayers with 
income levels of up to HUF 1.35 million are allowed a credit of 18 percent of their earnings with the limit of HUF 108,000. The credit is 
reduced by 18 percent of income in excess of HUF 1.35 million for taxpayers with incomes in excess of HUF 1.35 million, and is not 
available to taxpayers with incomes in excess of HUF 1.95 million. 
10  Low-income taxpayers are exempt from income taxes. In 2002, the taxpayers with incomes less than EUR 5,210 (double for married 
couples filing jointly) were exempt from income taxes. 
11  Italy has implemented a number of changes to its tax code effective starting with the 2003 tax year.  All values reported in our tables are 
based on the new formulation of the tax code. 
12  The deduction depends on the type of income earned. The standard deduction is of EUR 3,000. The deduction is increased to EUR 7,500 
for employment income, to EUR 4,500 for professional income.  Note that taxpayers with incomes in excess of EUR 26,000 are not eligible 
for any of the above listed deductions. 
13  This credit applies only to employment income.  The credit is a function of the level of income, and decreases as the income level 
increases.  The maximum level of the credit is EUR 235.  The employment credit scheme was changed in 2003.  Prior to 1 January 2003, 
the credit was a function of income, and ranged between EUR 51.65 and EUR 1,146.53.  No employment credit is granted if the taxpayer’s 
income exceeds EUR 52,000. An income tax credit of up to EUR 126 is available to taxpayers earning professional income. 
14  In addition to the personal allowance of Y 380,000 for national tax purposes, the taxpayer who derives employment income can also 
deduct a standard deduction (earned income relief) depending on the income level (increasing with income level).  Currently the earned 
income relief starts at Y 650,000. 
15  Each taxpayer is eligible for a credit equal to 20 percent of the income tax liability; the credit is capped at Y 250,000. 
16  In addition to the allowance of EUR 600 available to all employees, employees are granted a deduction of EUR 540 aimed at 
compensating employees for expenses associated with earning income.  Employees are also allowed to claim a deduction for commute costs; 
the deduction is based on the distance traveled between home and work, and the minimum deduction is set at EUR 396 per year for the 
first 4 km. 
17  Employees are allowed to deduct an amount based on the minimum wage, for a number of different reasons.  For instance, employees are 
allowed to deduct an amount equal to 30 days minimum wages if they receive a year-end bonus.  Mexico employs no standard deductions or 
deductions based on business expenses associated with employment income. 
18  A salary employment credit is allowed, and can be up to PS 1,157/month.  In addition, a low-income credit is available, and is based on 
the income of the taxpayer, with the maximum limit on the credit of PS 36,654.96/year. 
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19  In addition, an employee can claim a credit (the employment rebate) of up to EUR 1,104. 
20  Note that the national social security tax rate for the first two income tax rate brackets consists of 31.2 percent, making the total 
marginal tax rate of the combined social security and income tax 32.9 percent for the first bracket. 
21  We report in our tables statistics about the national income tax on gross income (toppskatt til staten).  In addition, the income tax system 
of Norway includes the municipal and national income taxes, imposed at a flat rate of 28 percent (versus 10.35 percent for the national 
income tax). It is important to note that the combined municipal and national income tax is marriage neutral. 
22  A minimum allowance of 2 percent of the base, with a minimum of NOK 4,000 and a maximum of NOK 45,700, can be deducted. 
23  In addition to the personal allowance, employees are also allowed to claim a standard deduction of PLZ 1,199.52 against their 
employment income. 
24  In addition to the personal allowance, taxpayers deriving employment income are also eligible for an employment allowance that ranges 
between EUR 2,400 and EUR 3,500 depending on the income level of the taxpayer. 
25  Employers are also allowed to deduct expenses associated with generating income; the minimum deduction is of CHF 1,900. 
26  This includes the standard deduction of $4,750 for single taxpayers and a personal allowance of $3,050. 
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Table 2. Notes on Basic Tax Exemptions and Marginal Tax Rate – Married Taxpayers 1 
COUNTRY   Deductions Credits Marginal Tax Rate Structure 
I II   III IV
BELGIUM EUR 4610 for each spouse    
DENMARK   
If a spouse cannot fully utilize the personal tax credit 
(based on personal allowance), then the remainder is 
transferred to the other spouse.  
If a spouse's income level is below DKK 198,000 (the 
threshold for the 6 percent tax rate addition), then 
the shortfall amount can be transferred to the other 
spouse.  
FRANCE Standard business deductions are doubled.  
The tax rate structure is based on family 
circumstances, and different rates apply to single and 
married taxpayers.2 
GERMANY    
Income splitting is permitted, in which case the sizes 
of all tax brackets are double those of the single 
taxpayer, with the marginal tax rates remaining the 
same. 
ICELAND    
There is a two-rate structure. The threshold level for 
the second MTR bracket begins at ISK 3,980,000 for 
singles, and the threshold is doubled for married 
couples. 
IRELAND   A personal credit available to single taxpayers is doubled for married couples filing jointly. 
There are two MTR brackets.  Single taxpayers move 
into the higher bracket at EUR 28,000, while married 
couples move at EUR 37,000 – EUR 56,000.3 
KOREA, REPUBLIC 
The tax code is characterized by a large number of 
available deductions.  Some deductions apply only to 
married couples. 
   
LUXEMBURG The single taxpayer deduction is doubled for married couples.  
For married couples filing jointly the rates are simply 
double those of a single taxpayer. 
NORWAY    The upper band for the lowest MTR bracket is increased to 364,000. 
POLAND    
Joint filing with income splitting is permitted, in 
which case the aggregate income is equally divided 
and the single taxpayer rate structure applies. 
PORTUGAL   The individual's tax credit is increased to 356.6 for each spouse.   
SWITZERLAND 7000 applies to the spouse with the lowest income.  
The band for the first MTR bracket is raised to 
24,900. In addition, a different MTR schedule is 
applied. 
UNITED KINGDOM   ₤ 210 – the credit increases to ₤ 546 if one of the spouses is 65 or older, and to ₤ 553 if older than 74.   
UNITED STATES  The standard deduction for married couples filing jointly is $7,950.     
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1  This table is constructed only for those countries where income splitting is permitted, or where differences in basic tax exemptions 
between single and married individuals exist. 
2  In addition, the tax benefits based on family circumstances are limited for households with high income levels. 
3  Single-earner couples advance into the second marginal tax bracket at an income level of EUR 37,000, but couples where both spouses 
earn income are subject to a threshold that is equal to EUR 37,000 plus the lower of EUR 19,000 or the lower of the two incomes.
 15 
 In addition to differences in the marginal tax rate structure, the 
basic personal exemptions/credits exhibit dramatic variation as well.  
Table 1 indicates the tax treatment of a single taxpayer with earned 
income only.  The personal exemptions can take a variety of different 
forms: a deduction, an allowance, a personal tax credit, and/or a tax-
exempt portion of income (e.g., a zero marginal tax rate bracket).  All 
countries except New Zealand provide some form of tax exemption to 
their taxpayers, most commonly in the form of a personal allowance or 
an earned income tax exemption.  In many instances more than one 
provision is available to the taxpayer.  It should be noted that Table 1 
provides a summary of exemptions available to a single non-disabled 
taxpayer with no dependents and earned income only; several other 
provisions are present for taxpayers who have children and who are 
disabled.  Table 2 provides similar information for married taxpayers. 
 
 
The Treatment of Married Couples 
 
There is clearly much heterogeneity in the marginal tax rate 
structure, the personal exemptions, and other tax deductions/credits 
that apply to taxpayers, whether single or married.  This heterogeneity 
extends to the tax treatment of married couples as well.  Table 3 lists 
the filing status permitted for married couples in OECD countries, and 
Table 4 lists some special provisions that apply mainly to single-earner 
couples. 
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Table 3. Filing Status and Income Treatment of Married Couples1 
  
COUNTRY 
  
Filing 
Status? 
Income 
Splitting? 
  
COUNTRY 
  
Filing 
Status? 
Income 
Splitting? 
I II III I II III 
AUSTRALIA Single  KOREA, REPUBLIC Single   
AUSTRIA Single  LUXEMBURG Joint Yes 
BELGIUM 2 Joint Yes 3 MEXICO Single   
CANADA Single  NETHERLANDS Single   
CZECH REPUBLIC Single  NEW ZEALAND Single   
DENMARK Single  NORWAY Single/Joint   
FINLAND Single  POLAND Single/Joint Yes 
FRANCE Joint Yes PORTUGAL Joint Yes 
GERMANY Single/Joint Yes SLOVAK REPUBLIC Single   
GREECE Joint  SPAIN Single/Joint   
HUNGARY Single  SWEDEN Single   
ICELAND 4 Single/Joint Yes SWITZERLAND 5 Joint  
IRELAND Single/Joint Yes TURKEY Single   
ITALY Single  UNITED KINGDOM Single   
JAPAN Single   UNITED STATES Joint 6 Yes 
1  We assume throughout that there are no children or other dependents 
present in the household.  We allow for single-income couples, but we assume 
that the dependant spouse is not disabled. 
2 Joint filing by married couples is required; married taxpayers are taxed 
separately on their earned income, but income generated by other sources is 
aggregated and added to the spouse with the highest income. 
3 Limited splitting of income is permitted; if the income of the spouse with the 
lowest income is less than 30 percent of that of the other spouse, the spouse 
with the highest income can transfer up to 30 percent of his income to the 
spouse with the lowest income. The transferred income cannot exceed EUR 
8,030. 
4  Married taxpayers have an option to file a joint assessment or a single person 
assessment. In the event the couple selects to proceed with a joint assessment, 
all personal allowances and tax brackets of a single taxpayer are exactly 
doubled. 
5  At the current time, the tax treatment of married couples is being debated in 
Switzerland. 
6  Married taxpayers in the U.S. may file a joint or a separate tax return.  
However, the separate return has one-half of the total standard deduction of a 
joint return, and the marginal rate brackets are set at one-half the increments 
of a joint return, so that there is typically no tax benefit to filing separately. 
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Table 4. Treatment of Single-earner Couples 
Single Earner Household Provisions 
COUNTRY 
 
Type of Provision Size 
Cutoff Level of 
Dependant Spouse's 
Income 
AUSTRALIA 1 Rebate A$ 1,489 A$ 6,237 
AUSTRIA Credit EUR 364 EUR 2,200 
BELGIUM 2 Income Splitting up to 30%  30% of Spouse Income 
CANADA Credit CAN$ 1,054 CAN$ 7,756 
CZECH REPUBLIC Deduction CZK 21,720 CZK 38,040 
DENMARK Allowance DKK 35,600 DKK 35,600 3 
FINLAND     
FRANCE Income Splitting    
GERMANY Income Splitting    
GREECE     
HUNGARY     
ICELAND Credit 4 Less than ISK 296,423   
IRELAND Income Splitting    
ITALY Credit EUR 42,223 – EUR 546,189 EUR 2,840.51 
JAPAN Allowance Y 380,000 5   
KOREA, REPUBLIC Deduction W 1,000,000 W 1,000,000 
LUXEMBURG Income Splitting    
MEXICO     
NETHERLANDS     
NEW ZEALAND     
NORWAY 6    
POLAND Income Splitting    
PORTUGAL Income Splitting    
SLOVAK REPUBLIC Allowance SKK 12,000 SKK 38,760 
SPAIN     
SWEDEN     
SWITZERLAND Different MTR Schedule    
TURKEY     
UNITED KINGDOM     
UNITED STATES Income Splitting 7    
1  In addition, in the event the income of the dependent spouse is under A$ 
10,800, the other spouse can make a contribution of up to A$ 3,000 to the 
retirement savings account of the dependent spouse.  The transfer amount is 
subject to abatement, and is cut off completely at the income level of A$ 
13,799. 
2  See Table 3. 
3  The personal allowance can be claimed as tax credit at the lowest tax bracket 
rate (5.5 percent), which is frequently done in practice.  In addition to the 
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transfer of the personal allowance, the unused part is added to the threshold 
amount of the spouse if the income of a married person does not exceed DKK 
198,000 (or the threshold for the 6 percent tax rate). 
4  If the personal credit of ISK 312,024 is not fully utilized by a married 
taxpayer, 95 percent of the remainder of the credit can be transferred to the 
spouse.  Single taxpayers with income levels exceeding ISK 3,980,000 pay an 
additional tax of 7 percent on the excess amount, and this threshold amount is 
doubled for married couples. 
5  Taxpayers whose incomes do not exceed Y 10,000,000 are also eligible for a 
deduction of up to Y 380,000.  The deduction is a function of the income level of 
the taxpayer, and is reduced as the income level increases. 
6  Taxpayers with supported dependents (including cohabitants) are also 
granted an allowance for their national and municipal income tax purposes of 
NOK 5,000.  Norway employs a fixed combined national and municipal income 
tax rate of 28 percent, so that a spouse with a dependent spouse will have her 
tax liabilities reduced by up to NOK 1400 when it comes to national and 
municipal income taxes.  Also, see Table 3. 
7  Couples are also allowed to claim a personal exemption of $3,050 for both 
spouses regardless of the employment status and income level of each spouse. 
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Of perhaps most importance, in most OECD countries the 
individual is the unit of taxation, and joint filing for couples is not 
permitted (Table 3).  Joint filing is required in only seven countries 
(Belgium, France, Greece, Luxemburg, Portugal, Switzerland, and the 
United States), while six countries allow couples to select the filing 
status (Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, Poland, and Spain).  In 
addition, there has been since 1970 a decided trend in OECD countries 
away from joint taxation and toward individual the individual as the 
unit of taxation.  Since 1970 seven countries have moved to individual 
income taxation (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom).  There are now a total of 17 OECD 
countries that use only the individual as the unit of taxation, and, as 
noted, another six countries in which the taxpayer can choose between 
single or joint taxation.  It is important to note that not every country 
that permits or requires joint filing allows joint assessment (e.g., 
income splitting between the spouses).  For instance, Greece, Norway, 
and Spain all have provisions for joint filing, but income splitting does 
not apply; this means that joint filing is not meaningfully different than 
single filing, except when joint filing allows a couple to use different 
personal exemptions, a potentially important difference that will be 
discussed later.  Income splitting is present in some form in only nine of 
the 32 OECD countries.  In most countries that allow income splitting, 
the income of the spouses is simply aggregated, so that the tax system 
does not differentiate between households with equal combined incomes 
based on how the income is distributed within the couple.  However, 
there are exceptions to this as well.  For example, Belgium allows only 
limited income splitting, which applies only to those couples in which 
there is a significant differential between the spouses’ incomes. 
 
Income splitting in the presence of a progressive tax rate 
structure creates a tax benefit to couples when spouses earn different 
incomes, as evidenced quite clearly by the U.S. experience.  
Furthermore, the tax benefit is a function of the difference in those 
incomes and the marginal tax rate structure.  For instance, Luxemburg 
has narrowly defined marginal tax rate brackets, and a relatively small 
differential can translate into a significant tax saving for a married 
couple versus two single taxpayers with similar incomes, as long as 
each spouse does not fall into the highest income bracket.  In contrast, 
in Iceland and Ireland a much larger difference in incomes may have no 
impact on tax liability due to the marginal tax rate structure. 
 
Tables 5a to 5d present our calculations on the effects on income 
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tax liabilities across households with different income levels and 
different allocations of incomes between spouses.  The effects reported 
in columns III, V, VII, and IX of these tables represent the tax benefit 
(or cost) of marriage, computed as the difference between the combined 
tax liability of the two individuals if they file as singles versus their tax 
liability if they marry and file based on the permitted status in the 
country.  A positive number indicates that singles pay more in taxes 
than married couples (e.g., a marriage bonus), while a negative number 
indicates the presence of a marriage penalty because taxes rise with 
marriage.  Columns IV, VI, VIII, and X convert this difference into the 
fraction of the total income tax liability of the (married) household. 
 
For simplicity, we divide households along two dimensions: the 
income level and the allocation (or the split) of that income between the 
spouses.  We select four levels of aggregate household incomes, 
structured as a percentage of the average earnings in the country 
during 2002 calendar year; note that column II reports the average 
wage for each country as given on the OECD website.  We choose four 
different levels of income, in order to assess the impact of the income 
tax at different points in the distribution of income: 50, 100, 200, and 
400 percent of average earnings in the country.  We also select four 
different types of households for the allocation of these income levels 
between the spouses: households where each spouse earns an equal 
amount (we refer to these as Type I households), households where 62.5 
percent of all household income is earned by one spouse (Type II), 
households where one spouse earns 75 percent of the combined income 
of the couple (Type III), and households where all of the income is 
earned by one spouse (Type IV). 
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Table 5a. Change in Income Tax Liability with Marriage – 50 Percent of Average Earnings 
Type I 
(25, 25) 
Type II 
(31.25, 18.75) 
Type III 
(37.5, 12.5) 
Type IV 
(50, 0) 
COUNTRY 
Average 
Earnings in 
2002 
(local 
currency)  
  
Net 
Amount 
% of Total 
Household 
Tax 
Liability 
Net 
Amount 
% of Total 
Household 
Tax 
Liability 
Net 
Amount 
% of Total 
Household 
Tax 
Liability 
Net 
Amount 
% of Total 
Household 
Tax 
Liability 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X 
AUSTRALIA 45851 0   0   120 6.73 1489 84.19 
AUSTRIA 23963 0   0   0   364 62.12 
BELGIUM 31173 -480 -52.77 -256.36 -27.88 -235.82 -17.32 642.58 42.84 
CANADA 38568 0   0   399 59.19 1054 133.34 
CZECH REPUBLIC 206042 0   0   1052 15.00 3258 50.21 
DENMARK 305306 0   0   0   1958 43.71 
FINLAND 29126 0   0   0   0   
FRANCE 1 21884 0   59.66   121.09   259.95   
GERMANY  33226             
GREECE 11575 0   0   0   0   
HUNGARY 1056835 0   0   0   0   
ICELAND 2277709 0   0   0   0   
IRELAND 1 25330 0   63.12   379.75   1,013   
ITALY 21466 0   0   0   546.18 25.62 
JAPAN 4254270  0   0   0   60800 449.72 
KOREA, REPUBLIC 21653892  0   0   0   0   
LUXEMBURG 1 31363 0   0   31.29   548.41   
MEXICO 58812 0   0   0   0   
NETHERLANDS 30919 0   0   0   0   
NEW ZEALAND 39411 0   0   0   0   
NORWAY 291900 0   0   0   0   
POLAND 25396 0   0   154.83 17.27 100.72 4.56 
PORTUGAL 1 8325 67.58   98.23   160.67   285.54   
SLOVAK REPUBLIC 153696 0   927   1200 36.43 1200 46.00 
SPAIN 16219 0   0   0   0   
SWEDEN 241766 0   0   0   0   
SWITZERLAND 1 64231 20.91   41.37   72.28   83.47 157.03 
TURKEY 9938274440 0   0   0   0   
UNITED KINGDOM 19708 62.4   154.38   210 123.38 210 29.50 
UNITED STATES 32188  -155  -75.83  21.48  10.51  222.65 108.93 739.70  361.89  
1  No values can be entered in the percent columns because the family tax liability is zero. 
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Table 5b. Change in Income Tax Liability with Marriage – 100 Percent of Average Earnings 
Type I 
(50, 50) 
Type II 
(62.5, 37.5) 
Type III 
(75, 25) 
Type IV 
(100, 0) 
COUNTRY 
  
Average 
Earnings in 
2002 
(local 
currency)  
  
Net 
Amount 
% of Total 
Household 
Tax 
Liability 
Net 
Amount 
% of Total 
Household 
Tax 
Liability 
Net 
Amount 
% of Total 
Household 
Tax 
Liability 
Net 
Amount 
% of Total 
Household 
Tax 
Liability 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X 
AUSTRALIA 45851 0   0   0   1489 17.22 
AUSTRIA 23963 0   0   0   364 8.08 
BELGIUM 31173 -576 -11.85 -624 -12.03 -672 -11.27 2054 31.99 
CANADA 38568 0   0   0   1054 24.75 
CZECH REPUBLIC 206042 0   0   0   4344 18.25 
DENMARK 305306 0   0   0   8396.36 58.40 
FINLAND 29126 0   0   0   0   
FRANCE 21884 0   197.78 38.04 471.48 90.69 1366.61 262.87 
GERMANY 33226             
GREECE 11575 0   0   0   0   
HUNGARY 1056835 0   0   0   0   
ICELAND 2277709 0   54,544.79   127,858.55   274,486.07   
IRELAND 25330 0   0   253.5 12.51 1,520 75.02 
ITALY 21466 0   0   0   496.6 8.69 
JAPAN  4254270 0   0   0   60800 44.10 
KOREA, REPUBLIC  21653892 0   0   0   90000 21.20 
LUXEMBURG 31363 0   190.87 20.05 912.74 109.08 2944.57 285.11 
MEXICO 58812 0   0   0   0   
NETHERLANDS 30919 0   0   0   0   
NEW ZEALAND 39411 0   0   0   0   
NORWAY 291900 0   0   0   0   
POLAND 25396 0   0   0   100.72 2.18 
PORTUGAL 8325 285.28 100.00 305.7 106.96 326.51 114.24 782.05 273.64 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC 153696 0   0   0   2400 20.71 
SPAIN 16219 0   0   0   0   
SWEDEN 241766 0   0   0   0   
SWITZERLAND 64231 220.1 414.07 176.78 132.48 230.9 100.63 258.19 39.11 
TURKEY 9938274440 0   0   0   0   
UNITED KINGDOM 19708 210 12.85 210 12.85 210 10.37 210 7.29 
UNITED STATES  32188 -232.5  -10.96  -146.02  -6.89  55.15 2.60 1237.5  58.35  
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Table 5c. Change in Income Tax Liability with Marriage – 200 Percent of Average Earnings 
Type I 
(100, 100) 
Type II 
(125, 75) 
Type III 
(150, 50) 
Type IV 
(200, 0) 
COUNTRY 
  
Average 
Earnings in 
2002 
(local currency) 
  
Net 
Amount 
% of Total 
Household 
Tax 
Liability 
Net 
Amount 
% of Total 
Household 
Tax 
Liability 
Net 
Amount 
% of Total 
Household 
Tax 
Liability 
Net 
Amount 
% of Total 
Household 
Tax 
Liability 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X 
AUSTRALIA 45851 0   0   0   1489 5.14 
AUSTRIA 23963 0   0   0   364 2.39 
BELGIUM 31173 -864 -4.85 -912 -5.09 -768 -4.12 3535 17.82 
CANADA 38568 0   0   0   1054 7.95 
CZECH REPUBLIC 206042 0   0   0   6950.4 9.50 
DENMARK 305306 0   0   4,856.82 8.47 13838 15.92 
FINLAND 29126 0   0   0   0   
FRANCE 21884 0   252.73 6.70 682.82 18.10 3459.18 91.68 
GERMANY  33226             
GREECE 11575 0   0   0   0   
HUNGARY 1056835 0   0   0   0   
ICELAND 2277709 0   0   17,830.52 3.24 336702.06 59.64 
IRELAND 25330 0   805.75 11.36 0   3500 34.66 
ITALY 21466 0   0 0.00 0   496.6 3.14 
JAPAN 4254270  0    0    0   109440 18.09  
KOREA, REPUBLIC 21652892  45000  5.31  45000  5.10  45000 5.20 180000 4.89  
LUXEMBURG 31363 0   699.61 8.79 2367.17 30.95 7969.83 102.60 
MEXICO 58812 0   0   0   0   
NETHERLANDS 30919 0   0   0   0   
NEW ZEALAND 39411 0   0   0   0   
NORWAY 291900 0   0   3145.5 31.55 3145.5 10.60 
POLAND 25396 0   0   0   1026.82 10.87 
PORTUGAL 8325 285.28 15.42 293.45 15.86 461.98 24.44 1312.12 70.91 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC 153696 0   0   0   3360 6.93 
SPAIN 16219 0   0   0   0   
SWEDEN 241766 0   0   0   0   
SWITZERLAND 64231 466.09 34.01 920.96 66.35 1043.1 51.32 1398.9 31.66 
TURKEY 9938274440 0   0   0   0   
UNITED KINGDOM 19708 210  3.52 210 3.52  250 3.45 210 2.60  
UNITED STATES  32188 -577.62  -7.92  -93.42  -1.28  872.22 11.96 4273.50  58.59  
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Table 5d. Change in Income Tax Liability with Marriage – 400 Percent of Average Earnings 
Type I 
(200, 200) 
Type II 
(250, 150) 
Table III 
(300, 100) 
Type IV 
(400, 0) 
COUNTRY 
  
Average 
Earnings in 
2002 
(local currency) 
  
Net 
Amount 
% of Total 
Household 
Tax 
Liability 
Net 
Amount 
% of Total 
Household 
Tax 
Liability 
Net 
Amount 
% of Total 
Household 
Tax 
Liability 
Net 
Amount 
% of Total 
Househol
d Tax 
Liability 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X 
AUSTRALIA 45851 0   0   0   1,489 2.07 
AUSTRIA 23963 0   0   0   364 0.94 
BELGIUM 31173 -960 -2.01 -960 -2.01 -912 -1.89 3,535.00 6.93 
CANADA 38568 0   0   0   1,054 3.03 
CZECH REPUBLIC 206042 0   0   0   6,950.40 3.39 
DENMARK 305306 0   0   0   13,838 5.50 
FINLAND 29126 0   0   0   0   
FRANCE 21884 0   63.35 0.44 1223.45 8.46 7,149.00 49.42 
GERMANY  33226             
GREECE 11575 0   0   0   0   
HUNGARY 1056835 0   0   0   0   
ICELAND 2277709 0   39440.55 2.19 119160 6.61 575,022.79 31.62 
IRELAND 25330 0   0   0   3,500 11.16 
ITALY 21466 0   0   0   422.23 1.15 
JAPAN 4254270  0   0   0   108300 4.10 
KOREA, REPUBLIC 21653892  90000 11.39 90000 10.50 90000 9.15 270000 1.90 
LUXEMBURG 31363 0   0   5631.42 18.10 7870.19 24.82 
MEXICO 58812 0   0   0   0   
NETHERLANDS 30919 0   0   0   0   
NEW ZEALAND 39411 0   0   0   0   
NORWAY 291900 0   0   0   3145.5 2.49 
POLAND 25396 0   0   1505.08 6.82 7462.83 35.62 
PORTUGAL 8325 285.27 4.72 604.83 10.01 1021.09 16.91 2783.73 46.10 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC 153696 0   0   0   4560 3.12 
SPAIN 16219 0   0   0   0   
SWEDEN 241766 0   0   0   0   
SWITZERLAND 64231 3469.04 42.43 2127.09 20.83 1377.67 10.45 1038.75 4.93 
TURKEY 9938274440 0   0   0   0   
UNITED KINGDOM 19708 210 1.28 210 1.21 210 1.10 210 0.82 
UNITED STATES  32188 -1542.06 -6.25  -1425.69  -5.78  -461.7 -1.87 5836.2 23.65 
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The income tax treatment of Type I households, in which there is an equal split of 
household income between the members, is perhaps the most interesting aspect of the 
differential treatment by the tax system.  In countries where joint income assessment is not 
permitted and where there are no differences in personal exemptions due to marital status, 
Type I (and even Type II and Type III) households should not observe any benefits or 
penalties due to their marital status.  This is largely evident from Tables 5a through 5d.  In 
most all instances where the provisions for joint assessment exist, the marginal tax rate 
brackets faced by a single taxpayer are simply doubled for married couples (e.g., 
Luxemburg); equivalently, the combined income of the couple is divided by two, and then 
the single taxpayer rate structure is applied (e.g., Portugal).  Under these circumstances 
the tax rate structure remains marriage-neutral for households of Type I.  However, in 
some countries Type I households derive a marriage bonus/penalty from their marital 
status.  One example of this practice is Switzerland, where the tax rate structure for 
married taxpayers is different from single taxpayers both in the size of the brackets and in 
the numbers of brackets and their rates.  For single Swiss taxpayers there are ten non-zero 
marginal tax rate brackets and a zero rate bracket with a threshold level of income of CHF 
12,700; married taxpayers face thirteen non-zero marginal tax rate brackets and a zero-rate 
bracket cut-off level set to CHF 24,800, slightly less than twice the level of the single 
taxpayer.  The marginal tax rates are identical for the top bracket, but the sizes of the 
brackets for married taxpayers are not based on the tax brackets for single taxpayers. 
 
Joint assessment is not the only provision that exists for married couples.  
Differences in personal exemptions and credits based on marital status can also create a 
marriage bonus/penalty for Type I households.  This is evident in the tax codes of a number 
of countries.  For example, in Belgium the size of the basic personal allowance is reduced 
for married taxpayers to EUR 4,610 relative to EUR 5,570 for single taxpayers.  In Portugal 
the size of the tax credit is increased for a married taxpayer to EUR 356.60, from EUR 
213.96 for single taxpayers. In Korea married female taxpayers in two-earner couples are 
granted an additional personal deduction of W 500,000.  Couples in Switzerland with two 
earners get an additional allowance of CHFG 7,000 applied to the spouse with the lower 
income.  The United Kingdom has one of the most well defined marriage benefits, although 
the size of the benefit is relatively small.  U.K. taxpayers are granted a married couple 
allowance that is dependent on the age of the taxpayers, with taxpayers older than 74 
deriving the largest allowance.  The size of the allowance for couples with both spouses 
aged under 65 is ₤ 2,110.  The allowance is then converted into a tax credit at a 10 percent 
rate, and it can be allocated between the spouses based on their own selection, with the 
possibility that only one spouse derives the entire credit, thereby making the provision 
completely independent of the distribution of income within the couple.  It appears that 
such treatments are very limited.  Instead, we tend to find in most OECD countries that the 
income tax treatment of couples with equal incomes is largely marriage neutral (subject to 
the exceptions that we have discussed).  
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Type II and Type III households derive income tax benefits in all countries where 
joint assessment/income splitting is permitted.  The one exception is Belgium, where only 
limited income splitting is permitted and where the reduced personal allowance for married 
couples creates a marriage penalty for married taxpayers. 
 
Another practice that is present in several countries is the transfer of unused 
personal exemptions between the spouses.  This practice in a way mimics income splitting 
because it allows the couple to combine their personal exemptions.  Examples of this 
practice include Denmark, where the unused portion of the personal deduction can be 
transferred to the spouse, and Iceland, where up to 95 percent of the unused personal credit 
can be applied to the tax return of the spouse. 
 
In some instances the threshold on only some of the marginal tax rate brackets is 
increased for married taxpayers. For example, Norway increases the threshold for the 
lowest MTR bracket from NOK 340,700 to NOK 364,000. 
 
As noted earlier, all OECD countries employ a progressive income tax structure at 
the central government level.8  Due to the progressive rate structure, the benefits of income 
splitting generally exist for those households with significant variation in incomes.  
However, when spousal earnings place each of the spouses into the highest income bracket, 
these benefits of income splitting disappear.  This is evident when one examines the effects 
on Type II households across Tables 5a to 5d.  Households with combined earnings equal to 
50 percent of the national average wage derive benefits of marriage in seven of the OECD 
countries, while households with combined earnings of 400 percent of the national average 
wage derive benefits in only six of the countries.  The size of the benefit when measured as 
a percentage of total tax liability of the couple also declines with the income level of the 
couple, as is evident from the tables.  
 
The effects of income splitting increase with the difference in incomes between the 
spouses, as shown by the differences between Type II and Type III households.  To further 
illustrate this point we examine in more detail two very different approaches to income 
splitting: Belgium and the United States. 
 
 
The Special Cases of Belgium and the United States 
 
Tables 6a and 6b calculate the effects on taxes for Belgium and the U.S for different 
households based on the income distribution within the household.  Both countries impose 
a marriage penalty through several avenues.  One is via personal allowances. In the U.S., a 
standard deduction for a married couple is $7,950, which is only 84 percent of double the 
single taxpayer’s deduction of $4,750.  This provision puts an effective penalty on taxpayers 
who chose to get married, as their decision to marry reduces their combined standard 
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deduction by $1,550.  In Belgium married taxpayers receive a combined deduction of EUR 
9,220, which is about 83 percent of double the single taxpayer’s deduction of EUR 5,570.  
However, the U.S. tax code requires aggregation of income of married couples, while the 
Belgian code permits limited transfer only if the earnings of one of the spouses do not 
exceed 30 percent of the earnings of the other spouse. 
 
In the case of the U.S., there is also a different structure of marginal tax rate 
brackets that creates a marriage penalty: the size of the brackets for married couples is less 
than double the brackets of the single taxpayer.  In addition to the reduction of the 
standard deduction, newlyweds will find themselves facing a different marginal tax rate 
structure with higher effective marginal tax rates.  Although the marginal rates themselves 
remain the same, the sizes of the brackets are not the same for married versus single 
taxpayers, with the exception of the lowest and highest brackets.  A single taxpayer moves 
into the third marginal tax rate bracket at the income level of $28,400, while a married 
couple filing jointly advances into the third bracket at the income level of only $47,450, only 
about 1.67 times (and not double) the level of the single taxpayer’s threshold.  
Consequently, a couple that marries will experience an increase in marginal tax rates, as 
they advance more quickly into higher marginal brackets.  It is interesting that the upper 
marginal tax rate bracket starts at the same income level of $311,950 for single taxpayers 
and married couples filing jointly. 
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Table 6a.  Marriage Tax Benefit in Belgium 1 
50%    100% 200% 400%Fraction of the Couple's Total 
Income Earned 
by the Spouse 
with the Lower 
Income Amount 2 
% of Tax 
Liability 3      Amount 2 
% of Tax 
Liability 3 Amount 2 
% of Tax 
Liability 3 Amount 2 
% of Tax 
Liability 3 
0         642.58 42.86 2054.76 31.99 3535.00 17.82 3535.00 6.93
0.05         445.90 30.34 1500.30 23.82 3535.00 19.34 3535.00 7.38
0.1         250.77 17.38 945.84 15.33 3535.00 21.14 4846.06 10.82
0.15        80.41 5.68 382.14 6.31 544.91 2.90 5691.07 13.33 
0.2 -77.70    -5.59 -254.15 -4.23 -198.33 -1.06 -674.90 -1.39 
0.25 -235.82 -  -  -  17.32 672.00 11.27 -768.00 -4.12 -912.00 -1.89 
0.3 -240.00 -  -  -  20.32 658.88 11.69 -864.00 -4.73 -942.33 -1.96 
0.35 -240.00 -  -  -  24.10 624.00 11.62 -898.88 -4.99 -960.00 -2.00 
0.4 -344.04 -  -  -  37.61 624.00 12.15 -894.32 -5.01 -960.00 -2.01 
0.45 -480.00 -  -  -  52.77 671.19 13.53 -864.00 -4.85 -960.00 -2.01 
0.5 -480.00 -  -  -  52.77 576.00 11.85 -864.00 -4.85 -960.00 -2.01 
1  The average income for Belgium in 2002 was EUR 31,173. 
2  This is computed as the difference in tax liabilities of the couple filing as singles versus as married.  
3 This is computed as percentage of the combined income tax liabilities of the couple if they file as married taxpayers. 
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Table 6b.  Marriage Tax Benefit in the United States 1 
50%    100% 200% 400%
Fraction of the 
Couple's Total 
Income Earned 
by the Spouse 
with the Lower 
Income Amount 2 
% of Tax 
Liability 3      Amount 2 
% of Tax 
Liability 3 Amount 2 
% of Tax 
Liability 3 Amount 2 
% of Tax 
Liability 3 
0         739.70 361.89 1237.50 58.35 4273.50 58.59 5836.5 23.65
0.05         619.00 302.84 996.09 46.97 3404.42 46.67 3905.22 15.83
0.1         498.29 243.78 754.68 35.59 2535.35 34.76 2481.46 10.06
0.15         383.59 187.67 513.27 24.20 1851.91 25.39 1469.58 5.96
0.2         303.12 148.30 271.86 12.82 1304.72 17.89 503.939 2.04
0.25       -  -  222.65 108.93 55.15 2.60 872.22 11.96 461.701 1.87
0.3   -     -  -  142.18 69.56 25.32 -1.19 485.96 6.66 1136.27 4.60
0.35   -       61.71 30.19 105.79 -4.99 99.71 1.37 -1329.4 -5.39
0.4 -   -   -  -  -   18.76 -9.18 186.26 -8.78 286.55 3.93 1522.52 -6.17
0.45 -  -  -   -  -  -  -  99.23 48.55 232.50 -10.96 577.62 7.92 1542.06 6.25
0.5 -155.00 -  -  -  -  -  -  -  75.83 232.50 10.96 577.62 7.92 1542.06 6.25
1  The average income for the United States in 2002 was $32,188. 
2  This is computed as the difference in tax liabilities of the couple filing as singles versus as married.  
3 This is computed as percentage of the combined income tax liabilities of the couple if they file as married taxpayers. 
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As seen from Table 6a, the Belgian tax code provides a marriage 
bonus only to those couples where a significant income differential 
between the spouses exists, and effectively penalizes households where 
the spouses earn similar incomes.  In contrast, the U.S. code (Table 6b) 
allows couples with much smaller variation in incomes to derive 
benefits from marriage.  Interestingly, due to the structure of the 
marginal rate brackets in the U.S., households with different levels of 
combined taxable incomes experience marriage tax penalties at 
different levels of income distribution within the household. 
 
Belgium imposes a penalty on married couples by reducing the 
size of the couple’s personal deduction relative to that for single 
taxpayers.  The Belgian tax code provides some relief to couples where 
one of the spouses earns less than 30 percent of the income of the other 
spouse, but this relief has no impact on households where both spouses 
earn equal or near-equal incomes.  The tax impact of marriage on a 
couple where both earn taxable income of the national average wage (or 
EUR 31,173) is an increase in tax liability upon marriage of EUR 480, 
or 2.43 percent of the total tax liability of the married couple. 
 
 
One-earner Married Couples 
 
Type IV households consist of couples where only one spouse 
earns all of the income in the household. In most OECD countries, these 
households face some special tax provisions that are aimed at reducing 
income tax liabilities.  As noted earlier, Table 4 gives a summary of 
these provisions by country. 
 
 Income splitting/joint assessment is one of these provisions, but 
even in many of the countries with no provisions for joint assessment of 
income some provisions for a dependent spouse are often available.  
These provisions typically take the form either of an additional personal 
deduction based on family circumstances or of a tax credit.  In most 
instances where these provisions exist, they allow the dependent spouse 
to earn up to a certain level of income for full tax benefits, and are then 
reduced as the earned income of the dependent spouse begins to 
increase.  For example, Australia, Austria, Canada, Iceland, and Italy 
all use tax credits that permit a certain level of earned income by the 
dependent spouse; Iceland also allows spouses to transfer 95 percent of 
the unused portion of the personal credit.  Countries that offer 
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deductions to couples with one income earner also allow some income to 
be earned by the dependent spouse before removing the tax benefit. 
 
 Some limited splitting of income is practiced in Belgium, where 
households in which one spouse earns less than 30 percent of the 
income of the other spouse are allowed to transfer taxable income from 
the spouse with the higher income as long as that transfer does not 
exceed the after-transfer income of the lower income spouse. 
 
 Interestingly, some countries put effective tax penalties on 
households with single earners.  For example, the Swiss tax code 
contains a second-earner provision in the form of an allowance that is 
applied to the spouses with the lower income.  Korea provides a 
deduction to women wage earners in married couples, which tends to 
have the same effect as a second-earner provision. 
 
 
Summary 
  
Finland, Greece, Hungary, Mexico, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey all have a marriage neutral tax 
structure.  Spain permits joint filing, but not income splitting.  In 
contrast, two countries (Belgium and the U.S.) often impose a marriage 
tax penalty on married couples, at least when the incomes of the 
spouses are largely similar.  The marriage penalty largely arises due to 
the reduction in married tax exemptions (e.g., the standard deduction) 
relative to those of single filers, as well as to features in the tax rate 
structure of singles versus married taxpayers. 
 
In general, the dominant practice of individual income taxation 
in OECD countries is to choose the individual rather than the family as 
the unit of taxation, and thereby to tax individuals on their own income 
even if they are married.  As a result, the individual income tax is 
largely marriage neutral in these countries.  This practice of taxing the 
individual is one that has tended to emerge in the last 30 years or so in 
these countries.  Even so, there remains much diversity in how OECD 
countries choose to tax the family. 
 
 
Conclusions 
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 What do we want an individual income tax to achieve? 
 
 It is certainly possible to eliminate (or to reduce) the marriage tax, 
and thereby make the income tax marriage neutral.  And there are 
certainly are good reasons for doing so.  There is little doubt that the 
existence of the marriage penalty (or the marriage bonus) introduces 
large, variable, and capricious inequities due to unequal tax treatment of 
taxpayers based solely on their marital status.  Even aside from these 
inequities, there is increasing evidence that the marriage penalty/bonus 
distorts decisions in an array of dimensions.9  More fundamentally, the 
marriage penalty may weaken the family as a basic societal institution, 
thereby leading to a range of social problems. 
 
However, it is worth remembering that the marriage 
penalty/bonus exists in any (progressive) income tax largely because of 
the decision to make the family the unit of taxation, and this decision is 
typically made because the goal of Horizontal Equity Across Families is 
put at the center of the income tax.  Nevertheless, it is also worth 
remembering that there are other goals of an income tax, such as Equal 
Payments By Singles and Couples and Marriage Neutrality.  Further, it 
is also worth remembering that there is today an enormous, and 
increasing, diversity of family structures in most all OECD countries.  
Fifty years ago, the “traditional family” was typically a single-earner 
household with a stay-at-home spouse.  Now, two-earner families are 
the norm, cohabitation among opposite and same-sex couples is 
common, and non-marital and extra-legal joint living arrangements are 
widespread.  These newer types of households are, by many definitions, 
a “family.”  However, they are treated very differently, and often much 
less favorably, than the traditional households once envisioned as the 
norm by the tax codes in many countries.  A single individual can also 
be seen as a type of family, and singles are typically penalized, often 
quite heavily, by the income tax. 
 
It may well be, as many argue, that the importance of the 
traditional family unit still justifies its favorable tax treatment.  
However, it may also be time to recognize that a diverse society can no 
longer treat one family structure so differently than others.  
Elimination of the family as the unit of taxation, and restoration of the 
individual as the unit, would eliminate the marriage tax/subsidy (and 
also eliminate the singles tax).  This is the route that many OECD 
countries have chosen. 
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Still, it must be recognized that making the individual the unit 
of taxation is also not without problems.  An important justification for 
the use of the family as the unit of taxation is the notion that families 
with equal family income should pay equal taxes.  There is no question 
that making the individual the unit of taxation would violate this goal 
of Horizontal Equity Across Families.  There are also significant 
administrative and compliance issues from individual taxation.  How 
are itemized deductions split between partners?  How is unearned (or 
capital) income split between partners?  Who claims the tax benefits 
from children?  How do the tax enforcement agencies verify the 
legitimacy of these declarations?  What are the compliance costs of 
individual filing?  Many other such issues naturally arise, and, as 
shown by our discussion of OECD country practices, the ways in which 
these issues are resolved vary greatly across countries. 
 
There are no easy choices here.  As emphasized throughout, no 
tax system can achieve simultaneously the goals of Progressivity, 
Marriage Neutrality, Horizontal Equity Across Families, and Equal 
Payments By Singles and Couples.  More broadly, most all tax (and 
transfer) systems reflect an uneasy compromise between these and 
many other goals, such as raising revenue, minimizing marriage (and 
other) disincentives, helping low-income individuals and families, 
reducing administrative and compliance costs, supporting the family as 
a social institution, and the like.  It is inevitable that these goals are 
often conflicting.  Taxing the family requires facing these difficult 
tradeoffs directly. 
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N
 
otes 
 
1  See Musgrave (1959, 1976) for classic analyses and discussions of the 
meaning of equity in taxation. 
2  See Blum and Kalvin (1953) for a contrary view. 
3  Separate filing for married couples does not typically give a tax 
advantage to the couple.  Internal Revenue Service statistics show that 
in recent years over 95 percent of married couples file jointly. 
4  There are numerous implicit penalties and subsidies imposed by 
government programs, only some of which are related to income 
taxation.  The U.S. General Accounting Office (1996) identifies 1049 
federal laws that involve marital status in some way.  See Steuerle 
(1999) and Alm, Dickert-Conlin, and Whittington (1999) for detailed 
recent discussions of the tax treatment of the family in the U.S.  See 
Bittker (1975) for an earlier but still relevant discussion. 
5  We obtain country specific tax structure information from a variety of 
sources, including from the country’s own tax collection agency’s 
website, from the European Tax Handbook 2003 (2003), and from 
Individual Taxes 2003-2004: Worldwide Summaries, published by 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers.  We relied most heavily upon the European 
Tax Handbook 2003 (2003) in instances where there were discrepancies 
in the details of the income tax. 
6  Germany does allow business income taxation at the municipal level. 
7
  For instance, a single taxpayer with taxable income between EUR 
9,252 and EUR 55,007 will be subject to a marginal tax rate that varies 
between 23.02 and 48.5 percent, depending on the income of the 
taxpayer. 
8  An exception is Switzerland, where the highest income tax bracket 
actually has a lower marginal tax rate than the preceding bracket. 
9  For example, see Sjoquist and Walker (1996), Alm and Whittington 
(1997, 1999, 2003), Dickert-Conlin (1999), and Whittington and Alm 
(1997) for empirical evidence on marital decisions.  For a more 
general survey of much of this literature, see Whittington and Alm 
(2003). 
